Hostile Intent Identification by Movement Pattern Analysis: Using
  Artificial Neural Networks by Biswas, Souham & Nene, Manisha J.
Hostile Intent Identification by Movement Pattern 
Analysis: Using Artificial Neural Networks  
Souham Biswas 
J.K. Institute of Applied Physics & Technology 
University of Allahabad 
Allahabad, India 
souhambiswas@outlook.com 
 
Manisha J. Nene 
Dept. of Applied Mathematics and Computer Engineering 
Defence Institute of Advanced Technology, Defence 
R&D Organization, Ministry of Defence 
Pune, India 
mjnene@diat.ac.in
 
 
 
Abstract—In the recent years, the problem of identifying 
suspicious behavior has gained importance and identifying this 
behavior using computational systems and autonomous 
algorithms is highly desirable in a tactical scenario. So far, the 
solutions have been primarily manual which elicit human 
observation of entities to discern the hostility of the situation. To 
cater to this problem statement, a number of fully automated and 
partially automated solutions exist. But, these solutions lack the 
capability of learning from experiences and work in conjunction 
with human supervision which is extremely prone to error. In 
this paper, a generalized methodology to predict the hostility of a 
given object based on its movement patterns is proposed which 
has the ability to learn and is based upon the mechanism of 
humans of “learning from experiences”. The methodology so 
proposed has been implemented in a computer simulation. The 
results show that the posited methodology has the potential to be 
applied in real world tactical scenarios. 
Keywords—Hostility; Neural Networks; Artificial Intelligence; 
Defence; Maritime 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most daunting tasks pertaining to the defence 
forces of a country has always been the effective identification 
and elimination of threats which interfere with the interests or 
the security of the nation. In situations of conflict, the fallibility 
of human judgement caused by stress or any such factor in 
determining the hostility of a given target can prove to be fatal 
and might result in considerable loss of resources. Therefore, a 
need to automate the same is highly desirable. 
The term “hostility” is inherently multifarious. The 
meaning depends upon the observer. This implies that, there 
are a considerable number of variables pertaining to this 
characteristic, if viewed analytically. Every day, new attack 
techniques are observed and defence tactics are being 
innovated. It is impossible to define an all-encompassing set of 
parameters or variables which would successfully quantify 
“hostility” in a general sense. However, there is one parameter 
of hostility pertaining to the object in question that spans over 
the others and is potentially impervious to the nature of the 
observer; the location/existence of the object under 
observation. The location of a given object can be grilled to 
obtain a multitude of characteristics from which certain 
behavioural traits can be extracted and analysed. Although, a 
perfect analytical solution to this problem statement is far-
fetched as of now, a more promising approach is to incorporate 
the way humans try to solve this problem into a machine; to 
include the element of “intuition”. The approach posited here 
draws on the fact that the human mind is a continuously 
evolving palimpsest of neurons, which adapt and evolve to any 
situation. Hence, the deployment of artificial neural networks; 
even more for their reputation for being extremely fault 
tolerant which is of paramount importance when considering 
such problems with high margins for error. 
Background and related work: 
During the literature survey, it was observed that a small set 
of analytical approaches do exist [1], [5], which address this 
problem. The most prominent of which, is the US Patent 
termed “Detection of Hostile Intent from Movement Patterns” 
[1]. But, what these approaches lack is the trait to adapt 
according to situation. It is not possible to discretely classify a 
given behaviour as “hostile” or “not hostile”. Therefore, it is 
imperative that the system intended to make that classification, 
learn how to do so by itself and adapt in pace with the 
constantly evolving attack/defence tactics.  
Presented in this paper is an approach which seeks to make 
for the shortcomings faced by the present systems. The paper is 
organized as follows: Section II describes the various 
parameters and assumptions involved and basis of the 
methodology. Section III enumerates the actual methodology, 
critical parameters, algorithms and the processes involved. In 
Section IV, simulation results have been elucidated. Finally, 
Section V summarises and concludes the proposed work and 
mentions the scope for future work. 
II. PROPOSED WORK 
A. Basis of Hostility Detection 
One of the most prominent characteristics of the human 
brain is the tendency to correlate between new information and 
previous “experiences” to draw conclusions [7]. The degree of 
this correlation and the subsequent processing of the same 
allow us to make fuzzy predictions [6] or in one way, form an 
intuition. The notion of hostility in general, lies in previous 
experiences of such situations endured by an individual. When 
presented with a scenario for hostility detection, the brain tries 
to discern the degree of similarity between the new situation 
and a catalogue of “hostile” labelled situations previously 
encountered. A high similarity calls for evasive measures. To 
summarize, one takes steps to ensure that the sequence of 
events which led to the previously sustained events of hostility 
do not repeat. To model this as an automated solution, we 
consider neural networks. We follow a similar process of 
training the network that is; an expansive dataset of known 
hostile situations is made incident on the network. As the 
training proceeds, the network tends to form its own notions 
for enumerating hostilities. In other words, an artificial sense of 
intuition is formed. 
B. Assumptions & Parameters Involved 
To parameterize a given situation for neural network 
training [4], we consider the locations of the objects. This 
quantity maybe in parametric, polar or any other co-ordinate 
form. The definitions of a few prominent terminologies are 
given below- 
• Area of Observation: It is the physical region which 
is being monitored for hostile activities. Practically, 
this can translate to a given region on the shore, the 
range of a radar, etc. 
• Object: Any entity inside the area of observation 
which will be subject to probation for determination of 
hostility is termed as “object”. 
• Hostility: It is the probability that an object will 
commit an act of hostility in the immediate future. 
Other parameters derived from the locations of objects like 
the speed and direction of object, density of objects in a given 
area etc. may also be computed and added as inputs to the 
neural network. The shape of the area of observation does not 
pose any constraint in location determination.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
The system will take inputs as the locations of the multiple 
objects inside the area of observation in the form of X and Y 
coordinates.  The neural network being utilized will be a 2-
layer feed forward network [8] with sigmoid function (1) as the 
activation function.  
 ௦݂௜௚ሺݔሻ ൌ  ଵଵା௘షೣ. (1) 
The datasets involved in training are of the following types- 
• Raw Dataset – This contains the records of locations of 
all the objects in the area of observation and their 
corresponding probabilities of hostility. 
• Normalized Dataset – This is the dataset which is 
actually used to train the neural network. Normalized 
Dataset is obtained by generating all the permutations 
of the raw dataset. 
System Variables and Relations- 
• ܰ : Number of objects inside the area of observation. 
• ܯ௞ : Number of entries in raw dataset having dataset 
index “݇” (݇௧௛ raw dataset). 
• ܭ : Number of training datasets. 
• ܯᇱ௞  : Number of entries in normalized dataset having 
dataset index “݇” (݇௧௛ raw dataset). 
• ܺ௩௨ೖ : X coordinate of object having index “ݒ” in ݇௧௛ 
raw dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ܺᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 : X coordinate of object having index “ݒ” in ݇௧௛ 
normalized dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ௩ܻ௨
ೖ : Y coordinate of object having index “ݒ” in ݇௧௛ 
raw dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ܻᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 : Y coordinate of object having index “ݒ” in ݇௧௛ 
normalized dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• Ω௩௨ೖ  : Probability of hostility of object having index 
“ݒ” in ݇௧௛ raw dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• Ωᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 : Probability of hostility of object having index 
“ ݒ ” in ݇௧௛  normalized dataset at observation index 
“ݑ”.  
• ௩ܲ௨
ೖ : This denotes the location of object having index 
“ݒ” at observation index “ݑ” at the ݇௧௛  raw dataset 
index. 
• ܲᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 : This denotes the location of object having index 
“ݒ” at observation index “ݑ” at the ݇௧௛  normalized 
dataset index.  
• ܣ௞௨ : Locations of all objects (sets of X-Y coordinates) 
in ݇௧௛ raw dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ܣᇱ௞௨ : Locations of all objects (sets of X-Y coordinates) 
in ݇௧௛ normalized dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ܤ௞௨ : Probabilities of hostility of all objects (sets of Ω௩௨ೖ 
values) in ݇௧௛ raw dataset at observation index “ݑ”. 
• ܤᇱ௞௨  : Probabilities of hostility of all objects (sets of 
Ωᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 values) in normalized dataset at ݇௧௛ observation 
index “ݑ”. 
• ௞ܶ௨ : Raw training data having observation index “ݑ” at ݇௧௛ training dataset. 
• ܶᇱ௞௨  : Normalized training data having observation 
index “ݑ” at ݇௧௛ training dataset. 
• ܦ௥  : Raw training dataset. 
• ܦ௡ : Normalized training dataset. 
• ܳ௞ : ݇௧௛ raw dataset. 
• ܳᇱ௞ : ݇௧௛ normalized dataset. 
• ܮ௞ : Dataset containing location data of all objects in 
the area of observation with raw dataset index “݇” (݇௧௛ 
raw dataset). 
• ܪ௞  : Dataset containing hostility probability data of all 
objects in the area of observation with raw dataset 
index “݇” (݇௧௛ raw dataset). 
 
• ܮᇱ௞ : Dataset containing location data of all objects in 
the area of observation with normalized dataset index 
“݇” (݇௧௛ normalized dataset). 
• ܪᇱ௞ : Dataset containing hostility probability data of all 
objects in the area of observation with normalized 
dataset index “݇” (݇௧௛ normalized dataset). 
Object index is a number assigned to each of the objects 
inside the area of observation for uniquely identifying 
them. 
Relations – 
The mathematical relations between the variables mentioned 
previously are enumerated as follows. 
 ௩ܲ௨
ೖ ൌ ቄܺ௩௨ೖ, ௩ܻ௨ೖቅ (2) 
 ܣ௞௨ ൌ ቄ ௩ܲ௨ೖ ׷  ݒ א ሾ1, ܰሿቅ ׊  ݑ א ሾ1, ܯ௞ሿ, ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ (3) 
 ܮ௞ ൌ ሼܣ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ሾ1, ܯ௞ሿሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ (4) 
      ܤ௞௨ ൌ ቄΩ௩௨ೖ ׷  ݒ א ሾ1, ܰሿቅ ׊ ݑ א ሾ1, ܯ௞ሿ, ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ  (5)
  ܪ௞ ൌ ሼܤ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ሾ1, ܯ௞ሿሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ (6) 
 ௞ܶ௨ ൌ ሼܣ௞௨,  ܤ௞௨ሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ, ݑ א ሾ1, ܯ௞ሿ (7) 
 ܳ௞ ൌ ሼܮ௞, ܪ௞ሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ (8) 
 ܦ௥ ൌ ሼܳ௞ ׷  ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿሽ (9) 
 ܲᇱ௩௨
ೖ ൌ ሼܺᇱ௩௨
ೖ, ܻᇱ௩௨
ೖሽ (10) 
 ܣᇱ௞௨ ൌ ቄܲᇱ௩௨
ೖ ׷  ݒ א ሾ1, ܰሿቅ ׊  ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧, ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ (11) 
 ܮᇱ௞ ൌ  ൛ܣᇱ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧ൟ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ  (12) 
 ܤᇱ௞௨ ൌ ቄΩᇱ௩௨
ೖ ׷  ݒ א ሾ1, ܰሿቅ ׊ ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧, ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ  (13) 
ܪᇱ௞ ൌ ൛ܤᇱ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧ൟ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ  (14) 
 ܶᇱ௞௨ ൌ ሼܣᇱ௞௨,  ܤᇱ௞௨ሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ, ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧  (15) 
 ܳᇱ௞ ൌ ൛ܮᇱ௞, ܪᇱ௞ൟ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ  (16) 
  ܦ௡ ൌ ൛ܳᇱ௞ ׷  ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿൟ  (17) 
  ܯᇱ௞ ൌ ܯ௞ ൈ ሺܰ!ሻ  (18) 
A. Procurement of Training Data 
Initially, the set ܦ௥  is to be generated which is basically the 
raw dataset as previously explained. 
TABLE I.  TABLE REPRESENTATION OF ܮଵ SET 
Sr. No. 
Object Locations 
A1 B1 A2 B2 A3 B3 
1. 234 874 214 856 764 214 
2. 045 698 102 523 154 601 
3. 487 035 924 157 245 682 
4. 147 256 651 654 213 746 
a. Here  ݇ ൌ 1 for ܮ௞ 
Table I is a tabular illustration of sample ܮଵ, since this is the 
first dataset, ݇ ൌ 1 . Here, the cell at index ሺ2, ܣ3ሻ  can be 
represented as ܺଷଶభ; the same can be extended to the other cells. 
This example dataset assumes there are only 3 objects in the 
area of observation. Similarly, we can have multiple training 
datasets. 
TABLE II.  TABLE REPRESENTATION OF ܮଶ SET 
Sr. No. 
Object Locations 
A1 B1 A2 B2 A3 B3 
1. 568 248 278 698 421 297 
2. 354 014 685 032 682 413 
3. 570 694 724 031 824 246 
b. Here  ݇ ൌ 2 for ܮ௞ 
Table II illustrates another dataset involved in training. 
Note that the two datasets are mutually independent and merely 
represent the log of locations of the multiple objects in the area 
of observation when an event of hostility had been previously 
sustained. Tables III and IV illustrate the tabular 
representations of the observed hostility probabilities (ܪ௞) of 
the objects in the area of interest for each of the datasets with  
݇ = 1 and ݇ = 2 respectively. 
TABLE III.  TABLE REPRESENTATION OF ܪଵ SET 
Sr. No. 
Object Hostility Probabilities 
A1 A2 A3 
1. 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2. 0.00 1.00 0.00 
3. 0.00 0.00 1.00 
4. 1.00 0.00 1.00 
c. Here  ݇ ൌ 1 for ܪ௞  
TABLE IV.  TABLE REPRESENTATION OF ܪଶ SET 
Sr. No. 
Object Hostility Probabilities 
A1 A2 A3 
1. 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2. 1.00 0.00 0.00 
3. 0.00 0.00 1.00 
d. Here  ݇ ൌ 2 for ܪ௞  
The probabilities in Table III are only “0” or “1” because 
the network will undergo supervised training. The cell at index 
ሺ3, ܣ1ሻ in Table IV can be represented as Ωଵଷమ; the same can 
be extended to the other cells. The system variables defined 
previously are illustrated in the context of the present example 
in the succeeding text. 
• ܰ ൌ 3 
• ܭ ൌ 2 
• ܯଵ ൌ 4 
• ܯଶ ൌ 5 
• ܮଵ = Table I 
• ܮଶ = Table II 
• ܪଵ = Dataset containing hostility probability data 
of all objects in the area of observation with raw 
dataset index “ 1 ” (Table III). Similarly, ܪଶ  is 
defined. 
• ܣଶଷ = 3rd row of Table II. 
• ܤଵଶ = 2nd row of Table III. 
• ܦ௥  = Collection of all tables I-IV organized as 
{(Table I, Table III), (Table II, Table IV)} 
Similarly, the other system variables can be computed. In 
practical application, this data can be obtained by analysing 
previous events of hostility sustained. The ܦ௥  set so generated 
cannot be used to train the neural network yet. It has to be 
subjected to normalization to get ܦ௡  (normalized dataset) 
which will be used to train the neural network. 
B. Generation of Normalized Training Data 
Normalization refers to generation of all permutations of 
the sets ܮ௞  & ܪ௞  for all ݇  from 1  to ܭ . This process is 
important because, a hostile object need not be assigned the 
same object index every time it is inside the area of 
observation. For example, suppose the neural network is 
trained using ܦ௥  and that in the dataset, for some ݊, ݑ and ݇,  
Ω௡௨ೖ ൌ 1.00.Correspondingly, the network is trained to output 
Ω௡௨ೖ ൌ 1.00 whenever the input is ܣ௞௨. Here, it is evident that 
the object with index ݊ is hostile. But suppose in the future, the 
same object is assigned an object index of ݊Ԣ; then, the system 
will fail to identify successfully this hostile object as it has 
been trained to identify the hostile traits of object at index ݊ 
and not at ݊Ԣ. Although, if the system is also trained with all the 
permutations of ܣ௞௨ and ܤ௞௨as input and output respectively, the 
system will always identify the hostile object irrespective of 
the object index assigned to it. To explain the normalization 
process, consider a scenario with ܰ ൌ 2, ܭ ൌ 1, ܯଵ ൌ 2. 
 ׵  ܣଵଵ ൌ ሼ ଵܲଵభ, ଶܲଵభሽ   
 ܣଵଶ ൌ ሼ ଵܲଶభ, ଶܲଶభሽ   
 ܤଵଵ ൌ ሼΩଵଵభ, Ωଶଵభሽ 
  ܤଵଶ ൌ ሼΩଵଶభ, Ωଶଶభሽ  
׵ Generating all permutations of ܣଵଵ, ܣଵଶ, ܤଵଵ and ܤଵଶ  
 ܣᇱଵଵ ൌ ൛ ଵܲଵభ, ଶܲଵభൟ   
 ܣᇱଵଶ ൌ ሼ ଶܲଵభ, ଵܲଵభሽ  
 ܣᇱଵଷ ൌ ሼ ଵܲଶభ, ଶܲଶభሽ  
 ܣᇱଵସ ൌ ሼ ଶܲଶభ, ଵܲଶభሽ  
Similarly, generate normalized dataset for set ܪଵ 
  
 ܯᇱଵ ൌ ܯଵ ൈ ሺܰ!ሻ [From (18)]  
 ֜  ܯᇱଵ ൌ 2 ൈ ሺ2!ሻ ൌ 8  
For some ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ, ݑ א ൣ1, ܯᇱ௞൧ 
 ܶᇱ௞௨ ൌ ሼܣᇱ௞௨,  ܤᇱ௞௨ሽ [From (15)] (19)  
Eq. 19 is the normalized training data at observation index 
“ݑ” as previously stated in Section II, B. In this, ܣᇱ௞௨ is input 
data to the neural network and ܤᇱ௞௨ is the set of target outputs. 
The derivation of ܦ௡ is as follows – 
 ܮᇱ௞ ൌ ሼܣᇱ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ሾ1, 8ሿሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, 1ሿ [From (12)]  
 ܪᇱ௞ ൌ ሼܤᇱ௞௨ ׷  ݑ א ሾ1, 8ሿሽ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, 1ሿ [From (14)] 
 ܳᇱ௞ ൌ ൛ܮᇱ௞, ܪᇱ௞ൟ ׊ ݇ א ሾ1, 1ሿ [From (16)]  
 ܦ௡ ൌ ൛ܳᇱ௞ ׷  ݇ א ሾ1, 1ሿൟ [From (17)] 
C. Neural Network Training 
The structure of the neural network to be trained by ܦ௡ is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Structure of Neural Network: A 2-Layer Feed Forward 
Network with 2N input neurons and N output neurons 
As shown in Fig. 1 the set ܫ is defined as- 
ܫ ൌ ሼܫ௩ :  ݒ א ሾ1, 2ܰሿሽ 
Hence, ܫ represents the set of input nodes and for an object 
with index ݒ, the set ݌௩ is defined as – 
݌௩ ൌ ሼܫଶ௩ିଵ , ܫଶ௩ ሽ 
The set ݌௩ represents the location of object having index ݒ as a 
set of X and Y co-ordinates. Similarly, ௩ܱ  is the hostility of 
object having index ݒ. While training, for a given ܳᇱ௞, we set 
݌௩ ൌ  ܲᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 and ௩ܱ ൌ  Ωᇱ௩௨
ೖ
 and cycle the value of ݑ from 1 to 
ܯᇱ௞ . In each iteration, the system is trained using 
backpropagation and gradually the certitude with which the 
system predicts the hostility probability of each object 
increases. We repeat this process for each training dataset i.e. 
for all ݇ א ሾ1, ܭሿ. But in each dataset, only 70% should be 
used for training, 20% for validation and the remaining 10% 
for testing purposes. The distribution of the data amongst 
these three groups has to be random. 
D. Validation of Neural Network 
The process of validation is carried out so as to determine 
when to stop training and to avoid over-fitting. At each 
iteration, error is calculated from the validation data, the 
formula of which is given in Eq. 38. 
 
 ܧ ൌ  ∑ ׬ൣݕ௝ሺݔ, ݓሻ െ ݐ௝൧ଶ݌൫ݔ, ݐ௝൯. ݀ݔ௠௝ୀଵ  (20)  
Eq. 20 is used, as the network is a feed-forward network 
which is trained using back-propagation [2]. The network 
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ܫଶே
here, is a set of functional mappings ݕ௝ሺݔ, ݓሻ [3], which relate 
an input ݔ with a given set of bias weights ݓ whose values are 
obtained through minimizing ܧ . Here, the joint probability 
density functions for the training data are given by ݌൫ݔ, ݐ௝൯ 
where ݆ ൌ 1,2, . . . , ܰ corresponds to each of the output 
neurons, ݕ௝ is the output of neuron ݆ and ݐ௝ is the target output 
for that neuron. Initially the error decreases and the gradient of 
the error decrease rate changes until approaching zero. 
Training stops when generalization stops improving network 
performance as measured from the validation data. 
E. Deployment of Neural Network 
The flowchart to illustrate the system working is given in 
Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Process Flowchart for Hostility Prediction System 
A given neural network can cater to only a fixed number of 
objects in the area of observation. Therefore, multiple neural 
networks having different number of inputs must be trained 
and generated before pragmatic deployment. For example, 
first, a neural network (having 8 inputs) maybe generated to 
analyze situations when only 4 objects are present in the area 
of observation; now, if the number of objects changes to 5, 
another neural network having 10 inputs will be needed. In 
node 001, the corresponding network is chosen. Subsequently 
in node 002, hostility probabilities of all the objects are 
calculated; now if an object with alarming hostility is 
identified (003), defensive measures should be taken to avoid 
any casualty. Finally, if the system fails to warn of an 
impending hostile event, then the network will retrain itself 
and learn from the experience after the hostile situation has 
subsided (006); much like the way humans learn from 
experiences. Therefore, a similar attack could be prevented in 
the future. This is indeed a drawback and is caused due to 
incomplete training. This is the reason why the network is 
trained with an expansive dataset of known hostile situations 
before deployment. 
IV. SIMULATION & RESULTS 
The proposed system has been simulated and implemented 
using MATLAB and C# on MonoGame® Framework. The 
neural network was generated in MATLAB. The simulation 
involves a front-end C# GUI application simulating a 
maritime radar environment running in parallel with 
MATLAB in the background in which the actual neural 
network computation and live-time training is taking place.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Confusion Matrix Pertaining to Testing Phase of Neural 
Network 
 
 
Fig. 4 Training Performance Measure of Neural Network 
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Fig. 6 System Simulation  
For simulation purposes, a scenario with 
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